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Title:Existence and computation of pure-strategy equilibria in models of legislative bargaining with reconsideration PDF Logo
Authors:Diermeier, Daniel
Fong, Pohan
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:Discussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1466
Abstract:Diermeier and Fong (2008a) recently proposed a legislative bargaining model with reconsideration in the context of a distributive policy environment. In this paper we prove general existence and necessary conditions for pure-strategy stationary equilibria for any finite policy space and preference profile. We also provide an algorithm to compute these equilibria. In any such equilibrium proposal power is endogenously limited compared to the case of no reconsideration. The general model is then applied to various policy environments, including a model with spatial preferences. In the context of a public goods environment we can show that lack of commitment increases policy efficiency.
Subjects:Legislative bargaining
evolving default
proposal power
lack of commitment
distributive politics
public goods
spatial model
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

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