Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31244 
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dc.contributor.authorBattaglini, Marcoen
dc.contributor.authorPalfrey, Thomas R.en
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T10:19:14Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T10:19:14Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31244-
dc.description.abstractWe study dynamic committee bargaining over an infinite horizon with discounting. In each period a committee proposal is generated by a random recognition rule, the committee chooses between the proposal and a status quo by majority rule, and the voting outcome in period t becomes the status quo in period t+1. We study symmetric Markov equilibria of the resulting game and conduct an experiment to test hypotheses generated by the theory for pure distributional (divide-the-dollar) environments. In particular, we investigate the effects of concavity in the utility functions, the existence of a Condorcet winning alternative, and the discount factor (committee impatience). We report several new findings. Voting behavior is selfish and myopic. Status quo outcomes have great inertia. There are strong treatment effects, that are in the direction predicted by the Markov equilibrium. We find significant evidence of concave utility functions.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanston, ILen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper |x1451en
dc.subject.jelD71en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordDynamic bargainingen
dc.subject.keywordvotingen
dc.subject.keywordexperimentsen
dc.subject.keyworddivide-the-dollaren
dc.subject.keywordcommitteesen
dc.subject.stwEinkommensumverteilungen
dc.subject.stwDynamisches Spielen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleThe dynamics of distributive politics-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn587665300en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:nwu:cmsems:1451en

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