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dc.contributor.authorBattaglini, Marcoen_US
dc.contributor.authorPalfrey, Thomas R.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T10:19:14Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T10:19:14Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31244-
dc.description.abstractWe study dynamic committee bargaining over an infinite horizon with discounting. In each period a committee proposal is generated by a random recognition rule, the committee chooses between the proposal and a status quo by majority rule, and the voting outcome in period t becomes the status quo in period t+1. We study symmetric Markov equilibria of the resulting game and conduct an experiment to test hypotheses generated by the theory for pure distributional (divide-the-dollar) environments. In particular, we investigate the effects of concavity in the utility functions, the existence of a Condorcet winning alternative, and the discount factor (committee impatience). We report several new findings. Voting behavior is selfish and myopic. Status quo outcomes have great inertia. There are strong treatment effects, that are in the direction predicted by the Markov equilibrium. We find significant evidence of concave utility functions.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherNorthwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science Evanstonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1451en_US
dc.subject.jelD71en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordDynamic bargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordvotingen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimentsen_US
dc.subject.keyworddivide-the-dollaren_US
dc.subject.keywordcommitteesen_US
dc.subject.stwEinkommensumverteilungen_US
dc.subject.stwDynamisches Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe dynamics of distributive politicsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn587665300en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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