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dc.contributor.authorDekel, Eddieen_US
dc.contributor.authorJackson, Matthew O.en_US
dc.contributor.authorWolinsky, Asheren_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T10:19:14Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T10:19:14Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31243-
dc.description.abstractWe examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two parties competing in a binary election may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent upon the outcome of the election. We analyze the role of the parties’ budget constraints and voter preferences. For instance, if only campaign promises are allowed, then the winning party depends not only on the relative size of the budgets, but also on the excess support of the party with the a priori majority, where the excess support is measured in terms of the (minimal) total utility of supporting voters who are in excess of the majority needed to win. If up front vote buying is permitted, and voters care directly about how they vote (as a legislator would), then the determination of the winning party depends on a weighted comparison of the two parties’ budgets plus half of the total utility of their supporting voters. These results suggest that vote buying can lead to an inefficient party winning in equilibrium. We find that under some circumstances, if parties budgets are raised through donations, then vote buying can be efficient. Finally, we provide some results on vote buying in the face of uncertainty.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherNorthwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science Evanstonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1386en_US
dc.subject.jelP16en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordvote buyingen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economyen_US
dc.subject.keywordcampaign promisesen_US
dc.subject.stw├ľkonomische Theorie der Demokratieen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitische Parteien_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleVote buyingen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn586098062en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

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