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Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31237
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Shneyerov, Artyom | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Wong, Adam Chi Leung | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-05-14T10:19:09Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-05-14T10:19:09Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2008 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31237 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We study the steady state of a market with incoming cohorts of buyers and sellers who are matched pairwise and bargain under private information. We first consider generalized random-proposer take-it-or-leave-it offer games (GRP TIOLI games). This class of games includes a simple random-proposer TIOLI game, but also many other interesting bargaining games. A friction parameter is t , the length of the time period until the next meeting. We find that as t - O, all market equilibria converge to the Walrasian limit, at the fastest possible rate O(t) among all bargaining mechanisms. Some important bargaining games not in this class may have non-convergent market equilibria. This is the case for the k-double auction: we find that there are equilibria that converge at a linear rate, those that converge at a slower rate or even not converge at all. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Northwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science Evanston | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Discussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1467 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C73 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C78 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D83 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Matching and bargaining | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | search | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | double auctions | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | foundations for perfect competition | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | rate of convergence | | en_US |
| dc.title | | The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 587666633 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
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