|
EconStor >
Northwestern University >
Kellogg School of Management - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University >
Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31230
|
| | |
| Title: | | Credible deviations from signaling equilibria  |
| Authors: | | Eső, Péter Schummer, James |
| Issue Date: | | 2005 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Discussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1406 |
| Abstract: | | In games with costly signaling, some equilibria are vulnerable to deviations which could be unambiguously interpreted as coming from a unique set of Sender-types. This occurs when these types are precisely the ones who gain from deviating for any beliefs the Re-ceiver could form over that set. We show that this idea characterizes a unique equilibrium outcome in two classes of games. First, in mono-tonic signaling games, only the Riley outcome is immune to this sort of deviation. Our result therefore provides a plausible story behind the selection made by Cho and Kreps' (1987) D1 criterion on this class of games. Second, we examine a version of Crawford and Sobel's (1982) model with costly signaling, where standard refinements have no effect. We show that only a Riley-like separating equilibrium is immune to these deviations. |
| Subjects: | | Signaling games Sender-Receiver robust equilibrium refinements. |
| JEL: | | C70 C72 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31230
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|