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Title:Strategic delegation and voting rules PDF Logo
Authors:Harstad, Bård
Issue Date:2007
Series/Report no.:Discussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1442
Abstract:When making collektive desicions, principals (voters or districts) typically benefit by strategically delegating their bargaining and voting power to representatives different from themselves. There are conflicting views in the literature, however, of whether such a delegate should be conservative (status quo biased) or instead progressive relative to his principal. I show how the answer depends on the political system in general, and the majority requirement in particular. A larger majority requirement leads to conservative delegation, but sincere delegation is always achieved by the optimal voting rule.
Subjects:Strategic delegation
collective decisions
voting rules
JEL:D71
D72
F53
H11
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

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