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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1437
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper shows that all perfect Bayesian equilibria of a dynamic matching game with two-sided incomplete information of independent private values variety converge to competitive equilibria. Buyers purchase a bundle of heterogeneous, indivisible goods and sellers own one unit of an indivisible good. Buyer preferences and endowments as well as seller costs are private information. Agents engage in costly search and meet randomly. The terms of trade are determined through bilateral bargaining between buyers and sellers. The paper considers a market in steady state. It is shown that as frictions disappear, i.e., as discounting and the fixed cost of search become small, all equilibria of the market game converge to perfectly competitive equilibria.
Schlagwörter: 
Matching and bargaining
search
foundations for perfect competition
two-sided incomplete information
JEL: 
C73
C78
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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