Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31204 
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dc.contributor.authorMailath, George J.en
dc.contributor.authorOlszewski, Wojciechen
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T10:18:46Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T10:18:46Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31204-
dc.description.abstractunder the profile after two distinct histories that agree in the last L periods is equal. Mailath and Morris (2002, 2006) proved that any strict equilibrium in bounded-recall strategies of a game with full support public monitoring is robust to all perturbations of the monitoring structure towards private monitoring (the case of almost-public monitoring), while strict equilibria in unbounded-recall strategies are typically not robust. We prove that the perfect-monitoring folk theorem continues to hold when attention is restricted to strategies with bounded recall and the equilibrium is essentially required to be strict. The general result uses calendar time in an integral way in the construction of the strategy profile. If the players' action spaces are sufficiently rich, then the strategy profile can be chosen to be independent of calendar time. Either result can then be used to prove a folk theorem for repeated games with almost-perfect almost-public monitoring.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanston, ILen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper |x1462en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordRepeated gamesen
dc.subject.keywordbounded recall strategiesen
dc.subject.keywordfolk theoremen
dc.subject.keywordimperfect monitoringen
dc.subject.stwWiederholte Spieleen
dc.subject.stwFolk-Theoremen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleFolk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn58766617Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:nwu:cmsems:1462en

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