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dc.contributor.authorAndina-Díaz, Ascensiónen_US
dc.contributor.authorMeléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T10:18:36Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T10:18:36Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31201-
dc.description.abstractWe present a model of participation in elections in small networks, in which citizens suþer from cross-pressures if voting against the alternative preferred by some of their social contacts. We analyze how the existence of cross-pressures may shape voting decisions, and so, political outcomes; and how candidates may exploit this eþect to their interest.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherNorthwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science Evanstonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1438en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordNetworken_US
dc.subject.keywordvotingen_US
dc.subject.keywordcross-cuttingen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziales Verhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziales Netzwerken_US
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleVoting in small networks with cross-pressureen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn587537302en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

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