EconStor >
Northwestern University >
Kellogg School of Management - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University  >
Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31200
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorDekel, Eddieen_US
dc.contributor.authorFudenberg, Drewen_US
dc.contributor.authorMorris, Stephenen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T10:18:35Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T10:18:35Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31200-
dc.description.abstractWe de.ne and analyze a strategic topology on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a .xed game and action de.ne the distance be-tween a pair of types as the diĆ¾erence between the smallest for which the action is interim correlated rationalizable. We de.ne a strategic topology in which a sequence of types converges if and only if this distance tends to zero for any action and game. Thus a sequence of types converges in the strategic topology if that smallest does not jump either up or down in the limit. As applied to sequences, the upper-semicontinuity prop-erty is equivalent to convergence in the product topology, but the lower-semicontinuity property is a strictly stronger requirement, as shown by the electronic mail game. In the strategic topology, the set of .nite types (types describable by .nite type spaces) is dense but the set of .nite common-prior types is not.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherNorthwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science Evanstonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1417en_US
dc.subject.jelC70en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordrationalizabilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordincomplete informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordcommon knowledgeen_US
dc.subject.keyworduniversal type spaceen_US
dc.subject.keywordstrategic topology.en_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwUnvollkommene Informationen_US
dc.titleTopologies on typesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn587462531en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
587462531.PDF309.38 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.