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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31199
  

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dc.contributor.authorEső, Péteren_US
dc.contributor.authorSzentes, Balázsen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T10:18:35Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T10:18:35Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31199-
dc.description.abstractWe develop a model of consulting (advising) where the role of the consultant is that she can reveal signals to her client which refine the client’s original private estimate of the profitability of a project. Importantly, only the client can observe or evaluate these signals, the consultant cannot. We characterize the optimal contract between the consultant and her client. It is a menu consisting of pairs of transfers specifying payments between the two parties (from the client to the consultant or vice versa) in case the project is undertaken by the client and in case it is not. The main result of the paper is that in the optimal mechanism, the consultant obtains the same profit as if she could evaluate the impact of the signals (whose release she controls) on the client’s profit estimate.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherNorthwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science Evanstonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1416en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD49en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordMechanism designen_US
dc.subject.keywordinformation disclosureen_US
dc.subject.keywordconsultingen_US
dc.subject.keywordadvisingen_US
dc.subject.stwSachverständigeen_US
dc.subject.stwSignallingen_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe price of adviceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn58746240Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

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