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dc.contributor.authorCalzolari, Giacomoen_US
dc.contributor.authorPavan, Alessandroen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T10:18:11Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T10:18:11Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31176-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the intricacies associated with the design of revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell. We consider two cases: resale to a third party who does not participate in the primary market and inter-bidder resale, where the winner resells to the losers. To influence the resale outcome, the monopolist must design an allocation rule and a disclosure policy that optimally fashion the beliefs of the participants in the secondary market. Our results show that the revenue-maximizing mechanism may require a stochastic selling procedure and a disclosure policy richer than the simple announcement of the decision to trade.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherNorthwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science Evanstonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1405en_US
dc.subject.jelD44en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordinformation linkage between primary and secondary marketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordoptimal disclosure policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordstochastic allocationsen_US
dc.subject.keywordmechanism design.en_US
dc.subject.stwMonopolen_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwDynamisches Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwUnvollkommene Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleMonopoly with resaleen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn586193200en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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