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Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31176
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Calzolari, Giacomo | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Pavan, Alessandro | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-05-14T10:18:11Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-05-14T10:18:11Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2006 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31176 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper examines the intricacies associated with the design of revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell. We consider two cases: resale to a third party who does not participate in the primary market and inter-bidder resale, where the winner resells to the losers. To influence the resale outcome, the monopolist must design an allocation rule and a disclosure policy that optimally fashion the beliefs of the participants in the secondary market. Our results show that the revenue-maximizing mechanism may require a stochastic selling procedure and a disclosure policy richer than the simple announcement of the decision to trade. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Northwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science Evanston | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Discussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1405 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D44 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D82 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | information linkage between primary and secondary markets | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | optimal disclosure policy | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | stochastic allocations | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | mechanism design. | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Monopol | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Auktionstheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Dynamisches Spiel | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Unvollkommene Information | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Monopoly with resale | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 586193200 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
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