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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31176
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| Title: | | Monopoly with resale  |
| Authors: | | Calzolari, Giacomo Pavan, Alessandro |
| Issue Date: | | 2006 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Discussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1405 |
| Abstract: | | This paper examines the intricacies associated with the design of revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell. We consider two cases: resale to a third party who does not participate in the primary market and inter-bidder resale, where the winner resells to the losers. To influence the resale outcome, the monopolist must design an allocation rule and a disclosure policy that optimally fashion the beliefs of the participants in the secondary market. Our results show that the revenue-maximizing mechanism may require a stochastic selling procedure and a disclosure policy richer than the simple announcement of the decision to trade. |
| Subjects: | | information linkage between primary and secondary markets optimal disclosure policy stochastic allocations mechanism design. |
| JEL: | | D44 D82 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
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