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dc.contributor.authorDahm, Matthiasen_US
dc.contributor.authorPorteiro, Nicolásen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T10:17:32Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T10:17:32Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31165-
dc.description.abstractSince campaign finance reform is usually motivated by the concern that existing legislation can not effectively prevent campaign contributions to ‘buy favors’, this paper assumes that contributions influence political decisions. But, given that it is also widely recognized that interest groups achieve influence by providing political decision makers with policy relevant information, we also assume that lobbies engage in non-negligible informational lobbying. We focus on a single political decision to be taken and offer a simple model in which the optimal influence strategy is a mixture of both lobbying instruments. Our main result is to show that campaign finance reform may have important side-effects: It may deter informational lobbying so that less policy relevant information is available and as a result political decisions become less efficient.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherNorthwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science Evanstonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1408en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordparty and candidate financing, lobbyingen_US
dc.subject.keywordinterest groupsen_US
dc.subject.keywordexpertsen_US
dc.subject.keywordinformation transmissionen_US
dc.subject.keywordcontributionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordinfluenceen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical decision making processen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlkampffinanzierungen_US
dc.subject.stwInteressenpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitische Entscheidungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleSide-Effects of campaign finance reformen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn587318244en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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