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dc.contributor.authorMichaelis, Peteren_US
dc.contributor.authorZiesemer, Thomasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-09-05en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:40:48Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:40:48Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30818-
dc.description.abstractPolicy diffusion refers to the process by which a political innovation like the introduction of a novel emission tax disseminates over time among countries. In order to analyze this issue from an economic point of view we develop a simple two-country-model of the taxation of emissions in presence of (possible) policy diffusion. Contrary to the usual Nash setting of simultaneous decision making we consider a Stackelberg game: In the first step the domestic government introduces an emission tax td thus acting as Stackelberg-leader, in the second step the foreign government decides whether or not to introduce an emission tax tf and in the third step the firms decide on their output quantities to be sold on a third country's market. For the case of an exogenous given probability of policy diffusion we show that the optimal domestic tax rate is c.p. the higher, the higher the probability of policy diffusion is. Moreover, we explore under which conditions first-mover behaviour by the domestic government leads to a higher tax rate compared to the Nash solution In the next step we introduce an endogenous probability of policy diffusion by combining our model with a strategic lobbying approach. As a result, the probability of policy diffusion is c.p. the smaller, the higher domestic tax rate td is. Consequently, in fixing the optimal tax rate the domestic government has to account for the foreign firm's lobbying activities otherwise it will choose a tax rate too highen_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv., Inst. für Volkswirtschaftslehre Augsburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesVolkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsreihe // Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Augsburg 302en_US
dc.subject.jelF18en_US
dc.subject.jelQ55en_US
dc.subject.jelQ58en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordemission taxesen_US
dc.subject.keywordfirst-mover behaviouren_US
dc.subject.keywordstrategic environmental policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolicy diffusionen_US
dc.titlePolicy diffusion, lobbying and the taxation of emissionsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn577049496en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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