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dc.contributor.authorFilipova, Liliaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-11-21en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:40:46Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:40:46Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30815-
dc.description.abstractThis paper considers moral hazard insurance markets when voluntary monitoring technologies are available and insureds may choose the precision of monitoring. Also privacy costs incurred thereby are taken into account. Two alternative contract schemes are compared in terms of welfare: (i) monitoring conditional on the loss with only the insurance indemnities based on the monitoring data, and (ii) unrestricted monitoring with both the premiums and the indemnities depending on the data. With any contract scheme some monitoring will be optimal unless the privacy costs increase too fast in relation to the precision of the monitoring signal. In the benchmark situation (without privacy costs) relying completely on both signals (monitoring and the outcome) informative of effort (ii) maximizes welfare. In the presence of privacy costs, the contract with conditional monitoring (i) might dominate the contract which fully includes the outcome and the monitoring signal into the sharing rule (ii). Apart from the direct effect of restricting privacy costs only to the state of loss, there are also an additional indirect incentive and a risk-sharing effect with this contract. Letting the individuals choose the precision of the monitoring technology at the time they reveal the data (ex post) is inefficient with either contract scheme.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv., Inst. für Volkswirtschaftslehre Augsburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesVolkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsreihe // Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Augsburg 293en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelG22en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden_US
dc.subject.keywordconditional monitoringen_US
dc.subject.keywordvalue of informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordprivacyen_US
dc.subject.stwKraftfahrtversicherungen_US
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden_US
dc.subject.stwKontrolleen_US
dc.subject.stwDatenschutzen_US
dc.subject.stwKostenen_US
dc.subject.stwVersicherungsökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwVertragstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleMonitoring and privacy in automobile insurance markets with moral hazarden_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn546463681en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsreihe, Universität Augsburg

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