Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30781 
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dc.contributor.authorWeikard, Hans-Peteren
dc.date.accessioned2009-06-24-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:31:45Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:31:45Z-
dc.date.issued1997-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-8543en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30781-
dc.description.abstractThe paper is an enquiry into dynamic social contract theory. The social contract defines the rules of resource use. An intergenerational social contract in an economy with a single exhaustible resource is examined within a framework of an overlapping generations model. It is assumed that new generations do not accept the old social contract, and access to resources will be renegotiated between any incumbent generation and their successors. It turns out that later generations will be in an unfortunate position regardless of their bargaining power.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversität Potsdam, Lehrstuhl Finanzwissenschaft |cPotsdamen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aFinanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge |x17en
dc.subject.jelD90en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.titleProperty rights and resource allocation in an overlapping generations model-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn52194869Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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