Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30781
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dc.contributor.authorWeikard, Hans-Peteren_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-06-24en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:31:45Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:31:45Z-
dc.date.issued1997en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-8543en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30781-
dc.description.abstractThe paper is an enquiry into dynamic social contract theory. The social contract defines the rules of resource use. An intergenerational social contract in an economy with a single exhaustible resource is examined within a framework of an overlapping generations model. It is assumed that new generations do not accept the old social contract, and access to resources will be renegotiated between any incumbent generation and their successors. It turns out that later generations will be in an unfortunate position regardless of their bargaining power.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv., Wirtschafts- und Sozialwiss. Fak. |cPotsdamen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aFinanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge |x17en_US
dc.subject.jelD90en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleProperty rights and resource allocation in an overlapping generations modelen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn52194869Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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