Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30754
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorSöderberg, Magnusen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-11en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:26:49Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:26:49Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30754-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates to what extent unregulated local monopolies attempt not to evoke the introduction of a formal price regulation by conforming to customers' and authorities' expectations. It is argued that utilities can meet expectations by setting prices that imitate neighbours' prices. The empirical evaluation rests on a cross-sectional data set representing all Swedish district heating utilities, and on a flexible nonlinear IV specification. It is found that while utilities' price setting schemes are insensitive to customer complaints, they are significantly influenced by the passive monitoring by authorities. The spillover effect from the 5-6 closest neighbours is around 40 %.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper |x2973en_US
dc.subject.jelL11en_US
dc.subject.jelL33en_US
dc.subject.jelL97en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordregulatory threaten_US
dc.subject.keywordspatial correlationen_US
dc.subject.keywordpriceen_US
dc.subject.keyworddistrict heatingen_US
dc.subject.keywordSwedenen_US
dc.subject.stwHeizkraftwerken_US
dc.subject.stwBetriebliche Preispolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwRegionale Preisstrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwErwartungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwStaatliche Preispolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwSchwedenen_US
dc.titleInformal benchmarks as a source of regulatory threat in unregulated utility sectorsen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn620952970en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

Files in This Item:
File
Size
162.55 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.