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Title:Can competition spoil reciprocity? A laboratory experiment PDF Logo
Authors:Bauernschuster, Stefan
Falck, Oliver
Große, Niels Daniel
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper 2923
Abstract:This paper investigates how group membership and competition among trustors interact with trust and trustworthiness in a laboratory one-shot trust game. To analyze these effects, we apply a 2x2 design. We induce group membership by letting subjects play coordination games with clear focal points, leading to higher investments and trustworthiness. Introducing competition leads to a decrease in trustworthiness, especially among partners. We argue that once competition comes into play, trustees perceive trustors' investments as the outcomes of a competitive bidding process rather than good intentions, which reduces reciprocity.
Subjects:trust
reciprocity
investment game
group membership
competition
JEL:C92
G11
Z13
L14
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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