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dc.contributor.authorEnglmaier, Florianen_US
dc.contributor.authorLeider, Steveen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-04en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:26:43Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:26:43Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30745-
dc.description.abstractAn important aspect in determining the effectiveness of gift exchange relations in labor markets is the ability of the worker to repay the gift to the employer. To test this hypothesis, we conduct a real effort laboratory experiment where we vary the wage and the effect of the worker's effort on the manager's payoff. Furthermore we collect additional information that allows us to control for the workers' ability and whether they can be classified as reciprocal or not. From our agency model of reciprocal motivation we derive non-trivial predictions about which is the marginal worker (in terms of ability) affected by our experimental variation and how different types of individuals, selfish and reciprocal, will react to it. Our model does substantially better than other theories in organizing the data.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2944en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordreciprocityen_US
dc.subject.keywordfairnessen_US
dc.subject.keywordreal effort experimenten_US
dc.subject.keywordpersonality testsen_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen_US
dc.subject.stwAustauschtheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwPersönlichkeitspsychologieen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleGift exchange in the lab - it is not (only) how much you give ...en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn620345268en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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