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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30742
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Vrijburg, Hendrik | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | De Mooij, Ruud A. | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-02-09 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-05-14T08:26:41Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-05-14T08:26:41Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2010 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30742 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper analyzes enhanced cooperation agreements in corporate taxation in a three country tax competition model where countries differ in size. We characterize equilibrium tax rates and the optimal tax responses due to the formation of an enhanced cooperation agreement. Conditions for strategic complementarity or strategic substitutability of tax rates are crucial for the welfare effects of enhanced cooperation. Simulations show that enhanced cooperation is unlikely to be feasible for small countries. When enhanced cooperation is feasible, it may hamper global harmonization. Only when countries are of similar size is global harmonization a feasible outcome. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper 2915 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | E62 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | F21 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H25 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H77 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | tax coordination | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | asymmetry | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | enhanced cooperation agreements | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | strategic tax response | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Unternehmensbesteuerung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Steuerharmonisierung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Steuerwettbewerb | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Optimale Besteuerung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Mehr-Länder-Modell | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Enhanced cooperation in an asymmetric model of tax competition | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 618099883 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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