|
EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30740
|
| | |
Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Gersbach, Hans | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-03-03 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-05-14T08:26:40Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-05-14T08:26:40Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2010 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30740 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | In this paper we examine the potential of democratic constitutions for the provision of divisible public goods in a large economy. Our main insights are as follows: When aggregate shocks are absent, the combination of the following rules yields first-best allocations: a supermajority rule, equal taxation, exemption of the agenda setter from taxation, and a ban on subsidies. In the presence of aggregate shocks to benefits or to costs of public-good provision, tax-sensitive majority rules, where the size of the required majority depends on the aggregate tax revenues, yield first-best allocations if a monotonicity condition is met. Finally, we explore the potential of first-best constitutions to induce voluntary participation by compensating agents belonging to the minority. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper 2939 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D62 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H40 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | democratic constitutions | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | tax-sensitive majority rules | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | constitutional rules | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | provision of public goods | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Öffentliches Gut | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Versorgung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Demokratie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Abstimmungsregel | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Steuerpolitik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Verfassungsökonomik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Democratic provision of divisible public goods | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 62011830X | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|