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dc.contributor.authorGersbach, Hansen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-03en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:26:40Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:26:40Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30740-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we examine the potential of democratic constitutions for the provision of divisible public goods in a large economy. Our main insights are as follows: When aggregate shocks are absent, the combination of the following rules yields first-best allocations: a supermajority rule, equal taxation, exemption of the agenda setter from taxation, and a ban on subsidies. In the presence of aggregate shocks to benefits or to costs of public-good provision, tax-sensitive majority rules, where the size of the required majority depends on the aggregate tax revenues, yield first-best allocations if a monotonicity condition is met. Finally, we explore the potential of first-best constitutions to induce voluntary participation by compensating agents belonging to the minority.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2939en_US
dc.subject.jelD62en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelH40en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keyworddemocratic constitutionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordtax-sensitive majority rulesen_US
dc.subject.keywordconstitutional rulesen_US
dc.subject.keywordprovision of public goodsen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwVersorgungen_US
dc.subject.stwDemokratieen_US
dc.subject.stwAbstimmungsregelen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwVerfassungsökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleDemocratic provision of divisible public goodsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn62011830Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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