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dc.contributor.authorMalcomson, James M.en
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-04-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:26:37Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:26:37Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30736-
dc.description.abstractRisk-neutral individuals take more risky decisions when they have limited liability. Risk-neutral managers may not when acting as agents under contract and taking costly actions to acquire information before taking decisions. Limited liability makes it optimal to increase the reward for outcomes relatively more likely to arise from desirable than from undesirable actions. The resulting decisions may be less, rather than more, risky. Making a decision after acquiring information provides an additional reason to those in the classic principal-agent literature for using contracts with pay increasing in the return. Further results on the form of contracts are also derived.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2943en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelD86en
dc.subject.jelJ33en
dc.subject.jelM52en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordmanagersen
dc.subject.keywordrisky decisionsen
dc.subject.keywordlimited liabilityen
dc.subject.keywordprincipal-agent contractsen
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen
dc.subject.stwInformationsbeschaffungen
dc.subject.stwHaftungen
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen
dc.subject.stwEntscheidungen
dc.subject.stwRisikofreudeen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleDo managers with limited liability take more risky decisions? An information acquisition model-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn620299606en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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