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dc.contributor.authorMalcomson, James M.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-04en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:26:37Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:26:37Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30736-
dc.description.abstractRisk-neutral individuals take more risky decisions when they have limited liability. Risk-neutral managers may not when acting as agents under contract and taking costly actions to acquire information before taking decisions. Limited liability makes it optimal to increase the reward for outcomes relatively more likely to arise from desirable than from undesirable actions. The resulting decisions may be less, rather than more, risky. Making a decision after acquiring information provides an additional reason to those in the classic principal-agent literature for using contracts with pay increasing in the return. Further results on the form of contracts are also derived.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2943en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelD86en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordmanagersen_US
dc.subject.keywordrisky decisionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordlimited liabilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordprincipal-agent contractsen_US
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen_US
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen_US
dc.subject.stwInformationsbeschaffungen_US
dc.subject.stwHaftungen_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwEntscheidungen_US
dc.subject.stwRisikofreudeen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleDo managers with limited liability take more risky decisions? An information acquisition modelen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn620299606en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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