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dc.contributor.authorFunk, Patriciaen_US
dc.contributor.authorGathmann, Christinaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-08en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:26:33Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:26:33Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30729-
dc.description.abstractUsing a new data set on Swiss state and local governments from 1890 to today, we analyze how the adoption of proportional representation affects fiscal policy. We show that proportional systems shift spending toward broad goods (e.g. education and welfare benefits) but decrease spending on targetable goods (e.g. roads and agricultural subsidies). Our evidence does not suggest that proportional representation increases the overall size of government. We provide new evidence on the mechanism behind these estimates. We show that proportional elections lead to better political representation of left-wing parties, which are associated with more spending. Furthermore, proportional elections lead to higher political fragmentation. However, since political fragmentation increases spending in a plurality system only, proportional elections reduce spending through its more moderate effects of fractionalized parliaments.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2958en_US
dc.subject.jelH00en_US
dc.subject.jelH10en_US
dc.subject.jelH40en_US
dc.subject.jelH52en_US
dc.subject.jelH53en_US
dc.subject.jelH72en_US
dc.subject.jelN83en_US
dc.subject.jelN84en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordelectoral systemen_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic financeen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical fragmentationen_US
dc.subject.keywordmatchingen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwTeilstaaten_US
dc.subject.stwGemeindefinanzenen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlsystemen_US
dc.subject.stwSchweizen_US
dc.titleHow do electoral systems affect fiscal policy? Evidence from state and local governments, 1890 to 2005en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn620441178en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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