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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30724
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Strausz, Roland | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-03-05 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-05-14T08:26:29Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-05-14T08:26:29Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2010 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30724 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper investigates political uncertainty as a source of regulatory risk. It shows that political parties have incentives to reduce regulatory risk actively: Mutually beneficial pre-electoral agreements that reduce regulatory risk always exist. Agreements that fully eliminate it exist when political divergence is small or electoral uncertainty is appropriately skewed. These results follow from a fluctuation effect of regulatory risk that hurts parties and an output-expansion effect that benefits at most one party. Due to commitment problems, regulatory agencies with some degree of political independence are needed to implement pre-electoral agreements. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper 2953 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D82 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | regulation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | regulatory risk | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | political economy | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | electoral uncertainty | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | independent regulatory agency | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Regulierung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Politische Entscheidung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Risiko | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Aufsichtsbehörde | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Selbstverwaltung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Public Choice | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | The political economy of regulatory risk | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 620398914 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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