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dc.contributor.authorStrausz, Rolanden_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-05en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:26:29Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:26:29Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30724-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates political uncertainty as a source of regulatory risk. It shows that political parties have incentives to reduce regulatory risk actively: Mutually beneficial pre-electoral agreements that reduce regulatory risk always exist. Agreements that fully eliminate it exist when political divergence is small or electoral uncertainty is appropriately skewed. These results follow from a fluctuation effect of regulatory risk that hurts parties and an output-expansion effect that benefits at most one party. Due to commitment problems, regulatory agencies with some degree of political independence are needed to implement pre-electoral agreements.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2953en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordregulationen_US
dc.subject.keywordregulatory risken_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economyen_US
dc.subject.keywordelectoral uncertaintyen_US
dc.subject.keywordindependent regulatory agencyen_US
dc.subject.stwRegulierungen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitische Entscheidungen_US
dc.subject.stwRisikoen_US
dc.subject.stwAufsichtsbehördeen_US
dc.subject.stwSelbstverwaltungen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe political economy of regulatory risken_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn620398914en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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