Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30707 
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dc.contributor.authorVogelsang, Ingoen
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-11-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:26:17Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:26:17Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30707-
dc.description.abstractBased on an idiosyncratic reading of the literature I propose intermediate (rather than tight or soft) regulation for balancing investment incentives with allocative efficiency and competition objectives. Intermediate regulation is compatible with incentive regulation and helps lengthening the regulatory commitment period necessary for incentives. However, such commitment for the whole time horizon of infrastructure or innovation investments is impossible. The compatibility of incentive regulation and efficient investment is thus in doubt. Incentive regulation for regular infrastructure investments therefore needs periodic updating based on rate-of-return regulation criteria. Innovative infrastructure investments may warrant regulatory holidays, which should be conditioned on strict criteria.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2964en
dc.subject.jelL50en
dc.subject.jelL90en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwAnreizregulierungen
dc.subject.stwInvestitionspolitiken
dc.subject.stwInfrastrukturinvestitionen
dc.subject.stwInnovationen
dc.subject.stwAllokationseffizienzen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleIncentive regulation, investments and technological change-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn620938668en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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