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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30683
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Bierbrauer, Felix | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-07-17 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-05-14T08:24:00Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-05-14T08:24:00Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2009 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30683 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We study a large economy model in which individuals have private information about their productive abilities and their preferences. Moreover, there is aggregate uncertainty so that the social benefits from taxation and public goods provision are a priori unknown. The analysis is based on a mechanism design approach that imposes a requirement of robustness with respect to individual beliefs and a requirement of coalition-proofness. The paper provides a tractable and intuitive characterization of incentive-feasible tax and expenditure policies: Incentive constraints associated with productive abilities reflect only individual behavior, whereas those associated with public goods preferences reflect only collective behavior. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper 2701 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D71 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D82 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H21 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H41 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | optimal taxation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | public goods provision | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | revelation of preferences | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | robust mechanism design | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Optimale Besteuerung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Öffentliches Gut | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Mechanism | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Offenbarte Präferenzen | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Optimal income taxation and public goods provision in a large economy with aggregate uncertainty | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 604953526 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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