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dc.contributor.authorBierbrauer, Felixen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-17en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:24:00Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:24:00Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30683-
dc.description.abstractWe study a large economy model in which individuals have private information about their productive abilities and their preferences. Moreover, there is aggregate uncertainty so that the social benefits from taxation and public goods provision are a priori unknown. The analysis is based on a mechanism design approach that imposes a requirement of robustness with respect to individual beliefs and a requirement of coalition-proofness. The paper provides a tractable and intuitive characterization of incentive-feasible tax and expenditure policies: Incentive constraints associated with productive abilities reflect only individual behavior, whereas those associated with public goods preferences reflect only collective behavior.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2701en_US
dc.subject.jelD71en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelH21en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordoptimal taxationen_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic goods provisionen_US
dc.subject.keywordrevelation of preferencesen_US
dc.subject.keywordrobust mechanism designen_US
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwMechanismen_US
dc.subject.stwOffenbarte Präferenzenen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleOptimal income taxation and public goods provision in a large economy with aggregate uncertaintyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn604953526en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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