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Title:Political stability and fiscal policy : time series evidence for the Swiss federal level since 1849 PDF Logo
Authors:Feld, Lars P.
Schaltegger, Christoph A.
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper 2691
Abstract:This paper explores the role of political stability on fiscal policy choices in a time-series analysis over 158 years on the Swiss federal level. We argue that the fiscal-commons problem of public finances is affected by the time-horizon of a finance minister. Arguably, the incentives for an incumbent to maintain a good reputation with sound policy decisions are stronger the longer the time-horizon of a respective term. In addition, a finance minister who succeeds to stay a long time in office normally enjoys a politically powerful position towards the parliament, the administration and the interest groups to influence policy decisions. In contrast, frequent government turnover weakens the position of the finance minister.
Subjects:political stability
fiscal policy
constitutional changes
JEL:H11
H50
H61
D78
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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