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dc.contributor.authorBorck, Rainalden_US
dc.contributor.authorWimbersky, Martinen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-11-16en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:23:51Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:23:51Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30670-
dc.description.abstractWe study voting over higher education finance in an economy with risk averse households who are heterogeneous in income. We compare four different systems and analyse voters' choices among them: a traditional subsidy scheme, a pure loan scheme, income contingent loans and graduate taxes. Using numerical simulations, we find that majorities for income contingent loans or graduate taxes become more likely as the income distribution gets more equal. We also perform sensitivity analyses with respect to risk aversion and the elasticity of substitution between high skilled and low skilled workers.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2829en_US
dc.subject.jelH52en_US
dc.subject.jelH42en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordvotingen_US
dc.subject.keywordhigher educationen_US
dc.subject.keywordfinancing schemeen_US
dc.subject.stwStudienfinanzierungen_US
dc.subject.stwHochschulfinanzierungen_US
dc.subject.stwVergleichen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwBildungsverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titlePolitical economics of higher education financeen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn612884503en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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