EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30667
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLessmann, Christianen_US
dc.contributor.authorMarkwardt, Guntheren_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-21en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:23:49Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:23:49Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30667-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines whether the federal structure of aid-receiving countries matters in explaining aid effectiveness. Following the decentralization theorem, the devolution of powers should increase aid effectiveness, since local decision-makers are better informed about local needs. At the same time, decentralization has reverse effects, e.g., through coordination problems, excessive regulation, administrative costs and local capture. Using panel data for up to 60 countries, we find that aid is less effective or even harmful in decentralized countries. Our results imply that donor countries should carefully consider how both anti-poverty instruments - financial assistance and decentralization - work together.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2805en_US
dc.subject.jelO10en_US
dc.subject.jelO20en_US
dc.subject.jelO40en_US
dc.subject.jelH70en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordforeign aiden_US
dc.subject.keywordgrowthen_US
dc.subject.keyworddecentralizationen_US
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungshilfeen_US
dc.subject.stwDezentralisierungen_US
dc.subject.stwFöderalismusen_US
dc.subject.stwWirkungsanalyseen_US
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungen_US
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungsländeren_US
dc.titleAid, growth and devolutionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn61076442Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
61076442X.pdf499.3 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.