Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30653 
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 2880
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
We analyze the incidence and welfare effects of unit sales taxes in experimental monopoly and Bertrand markets. We find, in line with economic theory, that firms with no market power are able to shift a high share of a tax burden on to consumers, independent of whether buyers are automated or human players. In monopoly markets, a monopolist bears a large share of the burden of a tax increase. With human buyers, however, this share is smaller than with automated buyers as the presence of human buyers constrains the pricing behavior of a monopolist.
Subjects: 
tax incidence
monopoly
Bertrand competition
experiment
JEL: 
C92
H22
L12
L13
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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