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dc.contributor.authorArce, Daniel G.en_US
dc.contributor.authorKovenock, Danen_US
dc.contributor.authorRoberson, Brianen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-03en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:23:32Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:23:32Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30641-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we examine a model of terrorism which focuses on the tradeoffs facing a terrorist organization that has the ability to utilize either or both suicide and conventional terrorism tactics. The terrorist organization's objective is to successfully attack at least one target. Success for the target government is defined as defending all targets from any and all attacks. In this context, we examine how terrorist entities strategically utilize suicide attacks when other modes of attack are available, and the optimal anti-terrorism measures.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2753en_US
dc.subject.jelC70en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordconflicten_US
dc.subject.keywordsuicide terrorismen_US
dc.subject.keywordweakest linken_US
dc.subject.keywordColonel Blottoen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitische Gewalten_US
dc.subject.stwPolicy-Mixen_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleSuicide terrorism and the weakest linken_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn608181757en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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