EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30636
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorKumru, Cagri Sedaen_US
dc.contributor.authorThanopoulos, Athanasios C.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-08en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:23:29Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:23:29Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30636-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes a fully funded social security system under the assumption that agents face temptation issues. Agents are required to save through individually managed Personal Security Accounts without, and with mandatory annuitization. When the analysis is restricted to CRRA preferences our results are congruent with the literature indicating that the complete elimination of social security is the reform scenario that maximizes welfare improvement. However, when self control preferences are introduced, and as the intensity of self control becomes progressively more severe the social security elimination scenario loses ground very rapidly. In fact, in the case of very severe temptation the elimination of social security becomes the least desirable alternative. Under the light of the above findings, any reform proposal regarding the social security system should consider departures from standard preferences to preference specifications suitable for dealing with preference reversals.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2778en_US
dc.subject.jelE60en_US
dc.subject.jelH55en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordfunded social securityen_US
dc.subject.keywordunfunded social securityen_US
dc.subject.keywordself-control preferencesen_US
dc.subject.stwSozialversicherungen_US
dc.subject.stwUmlageverfahrenen_US
dc.subject.stwSozialreformen_US
dc.subject.stwPräferenztheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwRisikoaversionen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleSocial security reform and temptationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn610181300en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
610181300.pdf282.2 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.