EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30632
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLiesegang, Caterinaen_US
dc.contributor.authorRunkel, Marcoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-02en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:23:26Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:23:26Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30632-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the effect of fiscal equalization on the efficiency properties of corporate income tax rates chosen by symmetric countries in a Nash tax competition game under the taxation principles of Separate Accounting and Formula Apportionment. Fiscal equalization ensures efficiency if the marginal transfer just reflects the fiscal and pecuniary externalities of tax rates. In contrast to previous studies, tax base equalization (Representative Tax System) does not satisfy this condition, but combining tax revenue and private income equalization does, regardless of which taxation principle is implemented. Under Formula Apportionment, tax base equalization is superior to tax revenue equalization if the wage income externality is sufficiently large.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2747en_US
dc.subject.jelH25en_US
dc.subject.jelH71en_US
dc.subject.jelH77en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordseparate accountingen_US
dc.subject.keywordformula apportionmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordfiscal equalizationen_US
dc.subject.stwKörperschaftsteueren_US
dc.subject.stwSteuertarifen_US
dc.subject.stwFormula Apportionmenten_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerbemessungen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerharmonisierungen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerwettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerwirkungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleCorporate income taxation of multinationals and fiscal equalizationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn60802712Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
60802712X.pdf305.23 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.