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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30631
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Belloc, Marianna | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Pagano, Ugo | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-01-26 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-05-14T08:23:26Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-05-14T08:23:26Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2009 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30631 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Most pre-crisis explanations of the various corporate governance systems have considered the separation between ownership and control to be an advantage of the Anglo-American economies. They have also attributed the failure of other countries to achieve these efficient arrangements to their different legal and/or electoral systems. In this paper we compare this view with the co-evolution approach based on the hypothesis that politics and corporate governance influence each other, generating complex interactions of financial and labour market institutions. Countries cluster along different complementary politics-business interaction paths and there is no reason to expect, or to device policies for, their convergence to a single model of corporate governance. We argue that this hypothesis provides a more convincing explanation of the past histories of major capitalist economies and can suggest some useful possible scenarios of their future institutional development. Bayesian model comparison suggests that the co-evolution approach turns out at least as influential as the competing theories in explaining shareholder and worker protection determination. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper 2883 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | G32 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | G34 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | J50 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | K22 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | P10 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | employment protection | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | corporate governance | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | ownership concentration | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Bayesian model estimation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Bayesian model comparison | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Politics-business interaction paths | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 61713264X | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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