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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30626
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Haavio, Markus | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Kotakorpi, Kaisa Ilona | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-06-29 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-05-14T08:23:22Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-05-14T08:23:22Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2009 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30626 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We analyse the determination of taxes on harmful goods when consumers have self-control problems. We show that under reasonable assumptions, the socially optimal corrective tax exceeds the average distortion caused by self-control problems. Further, we analyse how individuals with self-control problems would vote on taxes on the consumption of harmful goods, and show that the equilibrium tax is typically below the socially optimal level. When the redistributive effects of sin taxes are taken into account, the difference between the social optimum and equilibrium is small at low levels of harm, but becomes more pronounced when consumption is more harmful. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper 2650 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H21 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H30 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | excise taxation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | voting | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | self-control | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Genussmittel | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Optimale Besteuerung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Konsumentenverhalten | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Beschränkte Rationalität | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | The political economy of sin taxes | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 603336205 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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