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dc.contributor.authorBowles, Samuelen_US
dc.contributor.authorPolanía Reyes, Sandraen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-02en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:23:13Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:23:13Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30612-
dc.description.abstractPolicies and explicit private incentives designed for self-regarding individuals sometimes are less effective or even counterproductive when they diminish altruism, ethical norms and other social preferences. Evidence from 51 experimental studies indicates that this crowding out effect is pervasive, and that crowding in also occurs. A model in which self-regarding and social preferences may be either substitutes or complements is developed and evidence for the mechanisms underlying this non-additivity feature of preferences is provided. The result is a preference-based analogue to the Lucas Critique restricting feasible implementation to allocations that are supportable given the effect of incentives on preferences.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2734en_US
dc.subject.jelA13en_US
dc.subject.jelC90en_US
dc.subject.jelD02en_US
dc.subject.jelD63en_US
dc.subject.jelD64en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.jelD78en_US
dc.subject.jelE61en_US
dc.subject.jelZ13en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen_US
dc.subject.keywordbehavioural experimentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial preferencesen_US
dc.subject.keywordsecond besten_US
dc.subject.keywordmotivational crowdingen_US
dc.subject.keywordexplicit incentivesen_US
dc.subject.stwLucas-Modellen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Dienstleistungen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Wohlfahrtsfunktionen_US
dc.subject.stwAltruismusen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Normen_US
dc.subject.stwCrowding outen_US
dc.subject.stwMotivationen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleEconomic incentives and social preferences : a preference-based Lucas critique of public policyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn608009857en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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