Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30612
Authors: 
Bowles, Samuel
Polanía Reyes, Sandra
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper 2734
Abstract: 
Policies and explicit private incentives designed for self-regarding individuals sometimes are less effective or even counterproductive when they diminish altruism, ethical norms and other social preferences. Evidence from 51 experimental studies indicates that this crowding out effect is pervasive, and that crowding in also occurs. A model in which self-regarding and social preferences may be either substitutes or complements is developed and evidence for the mechanisms underlying this non-additivity feature of preferences is provided. The result is a preference-based analogue to the Lucas Critique restricting feasible implementation to allocations that are supportable given the effect of incentives on preferences.
Subjects: 
public goods
behavioural experiments
social preferences
second best
motivational crowding
explicit incentives
JEL: 
A13
C90
D02
D63
D64
H41
D78
E61
Z13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
437.75 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.