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dc.contributor.authorJacobs, Basen
dc.contributor.authorSchindler, Dirken
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-21-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:23:09Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:23:09Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30606-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes optimal linear taxes on labor income and savings in a standard two-period life-cycle model with endogenous leisure demands in both periods and non-insurable income risks. Households are subject to skill shocks in both periods of the life-cycle. We allow for completely general skill processes including those with persistence in skill shocks. We demonstrate that capital taxes are optimal since they reduce moral hazard in social insurance in two distinct ways: i) capital taxes reduce labor supply distortions on second-period labor supply, since second-period labor supply and saving are substitutes, ii) capital taxes reduce distortions in first-period labor supply by allowing for a lower level of labor taxes, although this effect is partially off-set because first-period labor supply and saving are complements. Capital taxes will be more attractive for social insurance if a larger part of risk is realized in the first period of the life-cycle. Our results suggest that taxing (retirement) saving is optimal to boost the retirement age and to reduce the tax-burden on working-age individuals.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2806en
dc.subject.jelH21en
dc.subject.jelD80en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordoptimal capital taxationen
dc.subject.keywordrisken
dc.subject.keywordAtkinson-Stiglitz theoremen
dc.subject.stwKapitalertragsteueren
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen
dc.subject.stwLohnsteueren
dc.subject.stwSteuerwirkungen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsangeboten
dc.subject.stwZeitpräferenzen
dc.subject.stwSparenen
dc.subject.stwSozialversicherungen
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleOn the desirability of taxing capital income to reduce moral hazard in social insurance-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn610765183en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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