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dc.contributor.authorJacobs, Basen_US
dc.contributor.authorSchindler, Dirken_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-21en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:23:09Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:23:09Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30606-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes optimal linear taxes on labor income and savings in a standard two-period life-cycle model with endogenous leisure demands in both periods and non-insurable income risks. Households are subject to skill shocks in both periods of the life-cycle. We allow for completely general skill processes including those with persistence in skill shocks. We demonstrate that capital taxes are optimal since they reduce moral hazard in social insurance in two distinct ways: i) capital taxes reduce labor supply distortions on second-period labor supply, since second-period labor supply and saving are substitutes, ii) capital taxes reduce distortions in first-period labor supply by allowing for a lower level of labor taxes, although this effect is partially off-set because first-period labor supply and saving are complements. Capital taxes will be more attractive for social insurance if a larger part of risk is realized in the first period of the life-cycle. Our results suggest that taxing (retirement) saving is optimal to boost the retirement age and to reduce the tax-burden on working-age individuals.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2806en_US
dc.subject.jelH21en_US
dc.subject.jelD80en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordoptimal capital taxationen_US
dc.subject.keywordrisken_US
dc.subject.keywordAtkinson-Stiglitz theoremen_US
dc.subject.stwKapitalertragsteueren_US
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen_US
dc.subject.stwLohnsteueren_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerwirkungen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsangeboten_US
dc.subject.stwZeitpräferenzen_US
dc.subject.stwSparenen_US
dc.subject.stwSozialversicherungen_US
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleOn the desirability of taxing capital income to reduce moral hazard in social insuranceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn610765183en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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