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dc.contributor.authorGarfinkel, Michelle R.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSkaperdas, Stergiosen_US
dc.contributor.authorSyropoulos, Constantinosen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-06-30en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:23:04Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:23:04Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30599-
dc.description.abstractWe augment the canonical neoclassical model of trade to allow for interstate disputes over land, oil, water, or other resources. The costs of such disputes in terms of arming depend on the trade regime in place. Under either autarky or free trade, the larger country (in terms of factor endowments) need not to be more powerful. Yet, under free trade, there is a stronger tendency for arming incentives to be equalized and thus for a leveling of the playing field.” Depending on world prices, free trade can intensify arming incentives to such an extent that the additional security costs swamp the traditional gains from trade and thus render autarky more desirable for one or both rival states. Furthermore, contestation of resources can reverse a country's apparent comparative advantage relative to its comparative advantage in the absence of conflict. And, where such conflict is present, comparisons of autarkic prices to world prices could be inaccurate predictors of trade patterns.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2680en_US
dc.subject.jelD30en_US
dc.subject.jelD70en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.jelF2en_US
dc.subject.jelF10en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordtrade opennessen_US
dc.subject.keywordproperty rightsen_US
dc.subject.keywordinterstate disputesen_US
dc.subject.keywordconflicten_US
dc.subject.keywordsecurity policiesen_US
dc.subject.stwAußenwirtschaftstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitischer Konflikten_US
dc.subject.stwGeopolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwSicherheitspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwFreihandelen_US
dc.subject.stwAutarkieen_US
dc.subject.stwKomparativer Kostenvorteilen_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleInternational trade and transnational insecurity : how comparative advantage and power are jointly determineden_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn603421814en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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