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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30591
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| Title: | | Internationally coordinated emission permit policies : an option for withdrawers from the Kyoto protocol?  |
| Authors: | | Bednar-Friedl, Birgit Farmer, Karl |
| Issue Date: | | 2009 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper 2764 |
| Abstract: | | This paper investigates the welfare costs of unilateral versus internationally coordinated emission permit policies in a two-country overlapping generations model with producer carbon emissions. We show that, for a net foreign debtor country, the domestic welfare costs of a unilateral domestic permit policy are larger than of an internationally coordinated policy if the world economy is dynamically efficient. From the perspective of a net foreign debtor country that has withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol, an internationally coordinated permit policy is dominated by climate political inaction also in the post-Kyoto era since bearing the costs of foreign actionism is cheaper, in terms of welfare, than agreeing on international policy coordination - unless the world economy becomes dynamically inefficient. |
| Subjects: | | emission permit policies trade overlapping generations welfare |
| JEL: | | Q52 Q54 D91 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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