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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30577
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Gersbach, Hans | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-11-17 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-05-14T08:22:47Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-05-14T08:22:47Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2009 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30577 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the platform choices of candidates would exist. Our game with financing of political campaigns exhibits two equilibria, depending on whether a majority of interest groups runs to support the leftist or rightist candidate. The equilibria generate a variety of new features of campaign games and may help identify the objective functions of candidates empirically. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper 2834 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | elections | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | campaign contributions | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | interest groups | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wahlkampf | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wahlkampffinanzierung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Interessenpolitik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Gleichgewicht | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Spieltheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Campaigns, political mobility, and communication | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 612915689 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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