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dc.contributor.authorGersbach, Hansen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-11-17en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:22:47Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:22:47Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30577-
dc.description.abstractWe present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the platform choices of candidates would exist. Our game with financing of political campaigns exhibits two equilibria, depending on whether a majority of interest groups runs to support the leftist or rightist candidate. The equilibria generate a variety of new features of campaign games and may help identify the objective functions of candidates empirically.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2834en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordelectionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordcampaign contributionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordinterest groupsen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlkampfen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlkampffinanzierungen_US
dc.subject.stwInteressenpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleCampaigns, political mobility, and communicationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn612915689en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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