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Title:Campaigns, political mobility, and communication PDF Logo
Authors:Gersbach, Hans
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper 2834
Abstract:We present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the platform choices of candidates would exist. Our game with financing of political campaigns exhibits two equilibria, depending on whether a majority of interest groups runs to support the leftist or rightist candidate. The equilibria generate a variety of new features of campaign games and may help identify the objective functions of candidates empirically.
Subjects:elections
campaign contributions
interest groups
JEL:C72
D72
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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