|
EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30576
|
| | |
| Title: | | Climate policy without commitment  |
| Authors: | | Golombek, Rolf Greaker, Mads Hoel, Michael |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper 2909 |
| Abstract: | | Climate mitigation policy should be imposed over a long period, and spur development of new technologies in order to make stabilization of green house gas concentrations economically feasible. The government may announce current and future policy packages that stimulate current R&D in climate-friendly technologies. However, once climate-friendly technologies have been developed, the government may have no incentive to implement the pre-announced future policies, that is, there may be a time inconsistency problem. We show that if the government can optimally subsidize R&D today, there is no time inconsistency problem. Thus, lack of commitment is not an argument for higher current R&D subsidies. If the offered R&D subsidy is lower than the optimal subsidy, the current (sub-game perfect) climate tax should exceed the first-best climate tax. |
| Subjects: | | time consistency carbon tax climate policy R&D endogenous technological change |
| JEL: | | H21 O30 Q20 Q28 Q42 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30576
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|