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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 2854
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyses tax competition and tax coordination in a model where capital flows occur in the form of mergers and acquisitions, rather than greenfield investment. In this framework, we show that differences in residence based taxes do not necessarily distort international ownership patterns. Moreover, tax competition yields globally efficient levels of source based corporate income taxes if residence based taxes on capital income are absent. In contrast, in the presence of residence based taxes on dividends, source based corporate income taxes are inefficiently high. The widespread view that tax coordination is less urgent if residence based taxes are available may therefore be misguided.
Schlagwörter: 
corporate taxation
tax competition
mergers and acquisitions
JEL: 
H54
H25
F23
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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