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dc.contributor.authorDemougin, Dominique M.en
dc.contributor.authorFabel, Oliveren
dc.contributor.authorThomann, Christianen
dc.date.accessioned2009-06-29-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:22:01Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:22:01Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30549-
dc.description.abstractWe derive the optimal contract between a principal and a liquidity-constrained agent in a stochastically repeated environment. The contract comprises a court-enforceable explicit bonus rule and an implicit fixed salary promise that must be self-enforcing. Since the agent's rent increases with bonus pay, the principal implements the maximum credible salary promise. Thus, the bonus increases while the salary promise and the agent's effort decrease with a higher probability of premature contract termination. We subject this mechanism to econometric testing using personnel data of an insurance company. The empirical results strongly support our theoretical predictions.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2645en
dc.subject.jelJ3en
dc.subject.jelM5en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordimplicit contracten
dc.subject.keywordexplicit bonus payen
dc.subject.keywordpremature contract terminationen
dc.subject.keywordcompensation and productivity estimatesen
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen
dc.subject.stwImplizite Kontrakteen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen
dc.subject.stwProvisionen
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwVersicherungsvermittlungen
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden
dc.titleImplicit vs. explicit incentives : theory and a case study-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn603334865en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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