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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30549
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Demougin, Dominique M. | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Fabel, Oliver | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Thomann, Christian | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-06-29 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-05-14T08:22:01Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-05-14T08:22:01Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2009 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30549 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We derive the optimal contract between a principal and a liquidity-constrained agent in a stochastically repeated environment. The contract comprises a court-enforceable explicit bonus rule and an implicit fixed salary promise that must be self-enforcing. Since the agent's rent increases with bonus pay, the principal implements the maximum credible salary promise. Thus, the bonus increases while the salary promise and the agent's effort decrease with a higher probability of premature contract termination. We subject this mechanism to econometric testing using personnel data of an insurance company. The empirical results strongly support our theoretical predictions. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper 2645 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | J3 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | M5 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | implicit contract | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | explicit bonus pay | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | premature contract termination | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | compensation and productivity estimates | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Anreizvertrag | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Implizite Kontrakte | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Leistungsanreiz | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Provision | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Agency Theory | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Versicherungsvermittlung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Deutschland | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Implicit vs. explicit incentives : theory and a case study | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 603334865 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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