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dc.contributor.authorDemougin, Dominique M.en_US
dc.contributor.authorFabel, Oliveren_US
dc.contributor.authorThomann, Christianen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-06-29en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:22:01Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:22:01Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30549-
dc.description.abstractWe derive the optimal contract between a principal and a liquidity-constrained agent in a stochastically repeated environment. The contract comprises a court-enforceable explicit bonus rule and an implicit fixed salary promise that must be self-enforcing. Since the agent's rent increases with bonus pay, the principal implements the maximum credible salary promise. Thus, the bonus increases while the salary promise and the agent's effort decrease with a higher probability of premature contract termination. We subject this mechanism to econometric testing using personnel data of an insurance company. The empirical results strongly support our theoretical predictions.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2645en_US
dc.subject.jelJ3en_US
dc.subject.jelM5en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordimplicit contracten_US
dc.subject.keywordexplicit bonus payen_US
dc.subject.keywordpremature contract terminationen_US
dc.subject.keywordcompensation and productivity estimatesen_US
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen_US
dc.subject.stwImplizite Kontrakteen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen_US
dc.subject.stwProvisionen_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwVersicherungsvermittlungen_US
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden_US
dc.titleImplicit vs. explicit incentives : theory and a case studyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn603334865en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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