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dc.contributor.authorDemougin, Dominique M.en_US
dc.contributor.authorHelm, Carstenen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-06-29en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:20:32Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:20:32Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30518-
dc.description.abstractSeveral European countries have reformed their labor market institutions. Incentive effects of unemployment benefits have been an important aspect of these reforms. We analyze this issue in a principal-agent model, focusing on unemployment levels and labor productivity. In our model, a higher level of unemployment benefits improves the works position in wage bargaining, leading to stronger effort incentives and higher output. However, it also reduces incentives for labor market participation. Accordingly, there is a trade-off. We analyze how changes in the economic environment such as globalization and better educated works affect this trade-off.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2670en_US
dc.subject.jelJ65en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelJ41en_US
dc.subject.jelE24en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordunemployment benefitsen_US
dc.subject.keywordincentive contractsen_US
dc.subject.keywordNash bargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden_US
dc.subject.keywordglobalisationen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitslosenversicherungen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkonomischer Anreizen_US
dc.subject.stwBerufliche Integrationen_US
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwInstitutionelle Infrastrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwGlobalisierungen_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.titleIncentive contracts and efficient unemployment benefitsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn603331009en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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