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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30518
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Demougin, Dominique M. | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Helm, Carsten | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-06-29 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-05-14T08:20:32Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-05-14T08:20:32Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2009 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30518 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Several European countries have reformed their labor market institutions. Incentive effects of unemployment benefits have been an important aspect of these reforms. We analyze this issue in a principal-agent model, focusing on unemployment levels and labor productivity. In our model, a higher level of unemployment benefits improves the works position in wage bargaining, leading to stronger effort incentives and higher output. However, it also reduces incentives for labor market participation. Accordingly, there is a trade-off. We analyze how changes in the economic environment such as globalization and better educated works affect this trade-off. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper 2670 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | J65 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D82 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | J41 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | E24 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | unemployment benefits | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | incentive contracts | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Nash bargaining | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | moral hazard | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | globalisation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Arbeitslosenversicherung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Ökonomischer Anreiz | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Berufliche Integration | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Moral Hazard | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Asymmetrische Information | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Nash-Gleichgewicht | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Institutionelle Infrastruktur | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Globalisierung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Agency Theory | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Incentive contracts and efficient unemployment benefits | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 603331009 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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